which these positions are reached, 3 and to illustrate the conduct of the Community as an operator within the UN.
I. The Legal Framework

A. European Community Status Within the United Nations
Regarding the development of organizational relations between the Community as such and the UN, a distinction should be made between the right of active legation, in this case the right of the Community to send a diplomatic mission to an international organization such as the UN, and the right to participate in the work of the organization.
In the latter regard one might distinguish between the question of participation in the strict sense of the term, i.e., the status of the Community within the framework of the international organization, and the problem concerning representation or, in other words, the question of which institution or person is entitled to speak for the Community in the UN. In this respect two sets of rules are relevant: on the one hand, the "external" rules, such as the statutes of the international organization, and on the other hand the "internal" rules, in cam the applicable Community rules. 4 Contacts with various members of the UN family started very early in the history of the European Communities. As early as in 1953 the European Coal and Steel Community concluded a cooperation agreement with the ILO. In July 1958 the EEC obtained the status of observer at the meetings of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL). Since then, ties with an increasing number of UN family members have been made and reinforced.
In a letter of 28 November 1958, the then UN undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs, Mr Philippe de Seynes, replying to a letter of 9 November from Mr Jean Rey, offered the President of the EC Commission a range of practical cooperation measures between the UN Secretariat and the Community, in particular those relating to the regional UN Commissions. Mr de Seynes also referred to the question of Community participation in the meetings of ECOSOC, the UN Trusteeship Council, the UNGA main committees and conferences organized under the UN aegis. He concluded that this difficult problem could not be resolved at the UN Secretariat level, but depended on a decision by the UN organ in question. In his reply of 9 December 1958, Mr Rey agreed that for the time being it was not urgent to establish formal relations between the two organizations.
It was not until 1974 that the European Community secured formal status with the head of the UN family. Indeed, it was only when the Federal Republic of Germany joined the UN on 18 September 1973 -a step which completed full UN membership of the EC States -that it became politically possible to formalize the relations between the Community and the UN. However, according to Article 4 of the UN Charter, full membership of the United Nations is open to states only. In the absence of an amendment to the Charter -which remains very unlikely -the Community has had to settle for a more modest participation in the work of the world organization.
Under General Assembly resolution 3208 (XXIV) of 11 October 1974, the EEC was invited "to participate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer."
5 At that time, this status was requested only in respect of one of the Communities having some interest in the UNGA work, namely the EEC. The Community's right of legation vis-d-vis UN headquarters was exercised when the EC Commission established an official UN observer mission in New York. After a period serving as an unofficial mission, the EEC observer mission obtained its official diplomatic status in 1976, confirmed in a letter of 4 August 1977 from Secretary of State Kissinger to Commissioner Soames.
The EEC is described as an observer in the blue UN calendar under chapter IV, after the chapters listing the full members, the specialized agencies together with other UN bodies and states not members of the UN. Chapter IV is labelled: "International organizations having received a standing invitation to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly as Observers and maintaining permanent offices at Headquarters.*' The other entities listed under chapter IV are COMECON, OAU and the Arab League. From a legal point of view, this categorization does not seem quite appropriate. Compared to its counterparts in this chapter, the EEC is the only "organization" to which its Member States have transferred powers or competences. It is precisely this feature which distinguishes the EEC from the traditional type of international organizations.
The way in which the EEC is listed does, however, illustrate some of the peculiarities relating to the organization of Community foreign relations in practice. The listing contains the names of the diplomatic members of the EC Commission's delSimultaneously, and in the same manner, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was admitted as an UNGA observer. That same year, the EEC participation arrangement with the ECOSOC was formalized. Telexes of 23 and 24 June 1974 from the UN -Secretariat informed the EC Commission of the ECOSOC decision adopted at its 50th session "to extend formal standing invitation to your organization to be represented by an observer at future sessions of the Council..."
egation. However, a footnote mentions that the EEC is represented by the Permanent Representative of the Community Member State exercising the Presidency of the EC Council and by the head of the delegation of the EC Commission. This two-headed or two-pronged formula for representation is a reflection of the Community's own arrangements pertaining to the role of spokesman for the EEC in the UN. This role is performed by the representative of the Presidency or the Commission according to circumstances, it being understood that the Commission representative, as a rule, speaks only on matters of Community competence.
This formula for two-headed representation, which is used in several other international organizations, is hardly compatible with the rules as perceived by the founding fathers of the Treaty of Rome. However, it does respond to a certain number of practical and political needs. The UNG A, like many other international organizations and conferences, deals with matters of Community and Member States competence, respectively, in such a mixture that it is impossible to make a clear distinction in every case.
6 Furthermore, the two-pronged formula gives added freedom of manoeuvre to the Community. The Member State exercising the EC Presidency may use its full membership rights of action -also in the name of the Community -where other observers, who do not enjoy this sophisticated representation formula, may meet difficulties.
B. European Political Cooperation and the United Nations
The Luxembourg Report, adopted on 27 October, 1970 by the Foreign Ministers of the then six Member States of the Community, contained the political foundation for European Political Cooperation. Consultations in New York on political matters on the UNG A agenda started as early as 1971. However, they did not flourish until the Federal Republic of Germany joined the UN as a full member in September 1973. In the document on the European Identity, adopted shortly after on 14 December, 1973, the EC Foreign Ministers emphasized the need to seek common positions wherever possible in international organizations, in particular in the United Nations.
Ever since, the Member States have progressively developed disciplines, in written and unwritten rules and procedures, with a view to improving their cohesion in the UN through the various modes of political expression, in particular joint statements, voting, and common explanations of vote. The EPC at the UN is a function of political cooperation in European capitals. The UN objectives pursued by the Community over the years may be summarized as follows: to reinforce the support of the UN, to further respect for the Charter, to defend the principle of universality of the Organization, to contribute to avoiding confrontation, to develop a construc- Community and handled by Community (and not EPQ instances. However, this conclusion does not seem to be drawn by all Member States. The result of such a divergent view would be that the world of monetary and/or economic fields escapes Community as well as EPC cooperation.
The provisions of Article 30(7)(b) aim at the problem of the procedures to be followed in international forums like ECOSOC or the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva where not all EC states are members. As highlighted by Simon Nuttall, the wording does not clarify whether Member States concerned are called upon to take full account of positions previously agreed within the EPC, or whether coordination among the Twelve is to be organized in specific cases to ensure that an EPC position exists. The ambiguity does reflect variations in practice. During the 1989 session of the UN Human Rights Commission, in which some EC Member States, not being full members, only participated as observers, it was possible to agree for the first time on a joint statement delivered by the Spanish presidency representative.
During the negotiations on the SEA, France and the United Kingdom, two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, are said to have stated categorically that Article 30(7)(b) does not apply to the work of the Security Council. 9 It is true that the issues taken up by the Council are rarely discussed in New York, even if they often relate to areas where elaborated EPC positions exist, such as the Middle East, Central America, Southern Africa, etc. Formally, at this stage of EPC evolution, it appears correct not to bind EC States by a rule like Article 30(7)(b).
The Security Council, in principle, is not a debating forum like the General Assembly where general policy guidelines are discussed. The role of the Security Council is to deal with concrete cases concerning potential or actual threats to international peace and security. The members of the Council -and they alone -are individually responsible for the views expressed and votes cast in the Council. In particular, the U.K. and France must be constantly aware of their particular responsibilities as permanent members where votes have a particular weight: a no-vote is a blocking veto.
It is inconceivable, however, that the EC States members of the Security Council would not feel bound by the basic policies adopted within the EPC and hence apply them to individual cases.
There is nothing to prevent EPC developing to a point where individual casesor rather the main issues which they raise -could be discussed among the Twelve in New York in a more regular fashion. The Non-Aligned Movement has established a special caucus for consultations with NA countries members of the Security Council, for example, on positions to be taken with regard to draft resolutions. 
C. EC/EPC Policy Coordination
As a rule, the various items on the UNGA agenda are considered in one of the seven main committees of the General Assembly before they are taken up and brought to a vote in the Plenary. Unfortunately, at least as seen from a point of order, the agenda is not composed with any regard to the division of competences between the Community and its Member States, and rarely can any item be put entirely into one of the three categories in which the EC/EPC system operates: 1) Firstly, an item may involve Community competence. That competence may be exclusive, i.e., Member States no longer have competence in commercial and agricultural policies.
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2) Secondly, an agenda point may be of particular interest to the Community, while not being within EC competence.
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3) Thirdly, an item may involve matters exclusively within the competence of Member States.
In practice, many subjects fall entirely under Member States' national competence and hence within the scope of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Some issues are of a "mixed" character and fall partly under national, partly under Community competence. Very few agenda items belong exclusively to the field of Community competence. These are essentially the economic and financial matters dealt with in the Second Committee.
Very often the various items on the agenda of the UNGA are tied together -for the EC and its Member States -in an "untidy bundle;" 12 many issues are presented in such a way that both the Community and the Member States have competence. A pertinent example of "mixed" competence is development policy. The Community is competent for its development policy (Lom6, aid to other Less-Developed Countries, etc.). Member States are competent for their own. In the Second Committee, issues like trade, debt and monetary problems may traditionally include elements of all three categories, intertwined in a grey area where the basis on which one is working is unclear. Now a similar experience is made in the Third Committee with regard to issues concerning narcotics, refugees, discrimination against women and racism.
Lastly, many joint statements cover a number of issues, in particular the Presidency's statement in the Plenary general debate, and most often more than one of the above-mentioned categories. That is why many joint speeches are prefaced by the words: "On behalf of the European Community and its Member States..."
To be complete, one could also mention areas where Community competence may be only potential. For example, economic consequences of disarmament, i.e., in the context of "the relationship between disarmament and development." A well chosen expression coined by an earlier head of the Commission's UN delegation, Michael Hardy.
In any event, these examples illustrate the importance of ensuring coordination between Community and Member States areas. As is known, Article 30(5) of the SEA provides that: "The external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in European Political Cooperation must be consistent" In this respect, Article 30(9) on local cooperation among the UN missions of EC Member States and of the EC Commission comes into play: "The High Contracting Parties and the Commission through mutual assistance and information, shall intensify co-operation between 13 their representations accredited to third countries and to international organizations." In practice it may sometimes be difficult to discern the EC from EPC in New York. As a matter of legal principle, however, it is important to recall the major differences between the two modes of cooperation.
A first difference between the EC and EPC which is often overlooked "relates to the transparency of objectives and methods."
14 While both processes may work towards the very general aim of achieving "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" the similarity ends there. The Treaty of Rome carefully defines the objectives of the parties and lists the instruments by which these goals are to be reached: a customs union and a common market. The Treaty also contains a series of substantive policy commitments in different economic areas. However, the EPC has no such substantive foundation. It remains a mechanism for coordination. The SEA has changed nothing in this respect when it says "to formulate and implement a European foreign policy." There is no mention as to what this policy might be. Additionally, the decision process follows different voting rules depending on the area of activity. Trade issues -in the UN context as well -would in principle be subject to the simple majority rule of Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. EPC decision-making is based on the consensus rule. 15 Finally, if in an area governed by Community competence it turns out that no Community position can be reached, the result according to Community law is that neither the Community not its Member States can express any position on that matter. Areas remain under Community competence and are not re-delegated to Member States just because no valid decision can be made.
In practice, however, the picture is blurred. In theory, the logical consequence of the lack of a Community position should be a non liquet, i.e., that Member States do not participate in the voting (abstention is not enough). In reality, nearly all draft resolutions containing matters under Community competence belong to the Second As suggested by Nutall, supra note 7 at 213, one should read "cooperation among their representations." See Weiler and Wessels, 'EPC and the Challenge of Theory' in European Political Cooperation in the 1980s, supra note 3 at 235.
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The SEA has not involved any change of this principle but may have softened it somewhat by adding a supplementary rule in Article 30(3Xc) of the SEA stating that the Member Stales "shall as far as possible refrain from impeding the formation of a consensus and the joint action which this could produce."
Committee which by tradition always tries to obtain consensus, thus avoiding a formal vote.
If no agreement can be obtained on an EPC matter, Member States are free to express their national positions. However, in doing so, account should be taken of the positions and legitimate interest of their EC partners. This principle, which has its counterpart in Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome, is reflected notably in Article 30(2)(c) of the SEA. In practice, this means that a Member State should give advance notice to its EC partners if it plans, for example, to make a national declaration or an explanation of vote when a common declaration is made. Such advance notice should also be given to partners before approaching other countries when a delegation envisages participating in drafting and/or co-sponsoring of resolutions during the UNGA.
In theory, the ball does not stop in New York. If an EC or EPC position cannot be obtained locally, the matter should be referred to Community instances in Brussels (COREPER) or the EPC presidency capital (the Political Committee), respectively, to be decided by the EC Council or a ministerial EPC meeting or ultimately by the European Council (not to be confused with the Council of Europe).
In daily life at the UN Headquarters, it is hard to discern a difference in the EC and EPC decision-making processes and it very rarely happens that UN matters under Community deliberation in New York are referred back to capitals. The EPC can also be represented by the Troika (current Presidency accompanied by preceding and succeeding Presidency representatives, the representative of the Commission and sometimes an official from the EPC Secretariat) in meetings with, for example, the Foreign Ministers of the Central American countries and Japan. Finally, the Presidency representative meets alone with a number of other Foreign Ministers, and may on these occasions often carry his national cap as well.
To the extent possible, EC partners speak after the Community spokesman in the general debate and often refer to the joint statement in their speeches.
This order is followed in other UNGA fora in case individual Member States feel the need to add national observations after the joint Community statement How frequently does this happen? It is difficult to formulate a principle or guide-line in this respect.
A stricter and more legalistic view would be as follows: the more a common position on a given subject is rich in substance and detail, the more it could be weakened and put into question if it were followed by individual EC partner statements, which adds to or subtracts from the joint statement This applies not only to interventions in a debate but in particular to explanations of vote. In case the Twelve present a common explanation of their identical votes it would, as a rule, not serve cohesion if individual explanations of the same vote are made. 19 However, in certain cases national statements constitute the political price to be paid for reaching a common voting position, and often it is low because the individual partner view only refers to a particular paragraph, not the resolution as a whole.
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In the Plenary general debate, Foreign Ministers of the Twelve may speak on any subject even if it involves some duplication and repetition of joint statements.
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It is becoming increasingly difficult to find appropriate slots in the speakers list for the UN General Assembly Plenary debate. An increasing number of UN members wish to speak during the first week of the three week general debate. This is the week where the major powers, in particular the US and the USSR, speak in the debate. These events attract Foreign Ministers, Apart from the joint statements in the general debate of the Plenary and of the First Committee, all other UNGA statements are as a rule prepared locally in New York on the basis of first drafts elaborated by the Presidency's staff. These drafts are circulated to partner missions and than examined by the local expert group.
Heads of State or Governments of other key nations, who seek to arrange bilateral meetings with each other during that week. For the Twelve, it is particularly important to be present in
At what stage of the coordination process do the EC UN missions seek their instructions? It depends, of course, on the individual mission and the subject matter. It is my impression, however, that the experts of the Twelve increasingly seek agreement "ad referendum" in New York before they send the text to capitals for instructions.
If the capitals agree to the draft, the Presidency may proceed to take action in New York. In case one or more capitals have comments and/or suggestions for amendments to the draft, which cannot be handled by "phone", a new meeting is called to solve outstanding differences. If disagreement prevails at the expert level, a normal solution is to leave out the controversial passage. In certain cases, where the dispute cannot be solved this way, e.g., because deletion would render the joint position void of any substance, experts refer to their superiors. These are the Permanent Representatives if the problem is sure to find a solution at this level. Most often experts refer back to capitals with a view to having the problem solved by the Political Committee or Foreign Ministers. In some instances, the Deputy Permanent Representative may be requested by the Heads of Delegations in New York to try to resolve outstanding difficulties.
In practice, statements in the UNGA are delivered in almost all cases by the representative of the Presidency. Statements on behalf of the Community and its Member States are normally delivered in one of the EPC languages English or French, which are also official UN languages. A small complicating factor emerged during the Spanish Presidency in the first part of 1989. Although the texts were prepared in one of the EC languages the presidency spokesman, of course, felt obliged to deliver the speech in Spanish, which is an official UN language.
The Commission representative is allowed to perform as the Community spokesman only where the entire subject-matter is covered by Community competence, such as trade and the Community's own development aid. Only 4 out of 105 common statements were delivered by the Commission representative during UNGA 43.
The fact that the Commission representative is only exceptionally admitted as Community spokesman is due to a number of reasons beyond the more legalistic 
III. The Twelve as a Collective Actor: An Overall Assessment
It is a considerable burden for the Presidency to prepare drafts for the growing number of joint statements. Where common positions have been tested and developed over the years, the Presidency may find it easier to arrive at the least common denominator language in the first draft and thereby reduce the time required for the negotiations among partners. The prospects of hitting the target in the first run also depend on the Presidency's readiness to forego its own priority issues which are not part of the "acquis politique" of the Twelve. Furthermore, UN issues do change over time. The UNGA is not only about apartheid, the Middle East and disarmament, which are among the longest-standing questions on the UN agenda, but those on which common positions have developed most slowly. be easier to obtain agreement among the Twelve on new UN issues than on older topics, where efforts to improve the cohesion of the Twelve have either been slow or in vain. At first glance, there may be a lot of truth in this supposition. Some of the old issues reflect fundamental divergences that can only be overcome in a broader political context, for example, concerning nuclear disarmament. Other UN issues, like the Middle East and apartheid, surfaced long before the inception of EPC and had been the subject of elaborate national positions long before political cooperation aimed at reaching common positions was developed. It is difficult to bridge longstanding divergences on such international issues, in particular if they relate, or are perceived to relate, to important national interests. Conversely, if a subject has been internationalized recently and therefore has not been subject to a traditional national policy-making process, joint positions of the Twelve sometimes seem to be reached more easily. One explanation might be that EPC has involved a new kind of working habit or discipline among policy-makers of the Twelve. Whenever a new topic is brought up it is now a first and perfectly natural reaction for each partner to ask: lution on the same issue may change over the years. Some agenda items only appear once every two years, etc.
Greater voting cohesion would require political decisions by capitals in order to overcome remaining political hurdles. Of course, harmonizing the votes of the Twelve should remain a common objective. However, the degree of their cohesion should be measures not only in quantitative terms but also in the ability of the Twelve to address the critical issues and to make an impact on the deliberations and negotiations of the world organization.
One way of improving EC/EPC performance which might be further explored would be to empower the spokesman of the Twelve to perform not only in that capacity but also as a negotiator on their behalf. In the Second Committee this is already the rule, as it should be, where matters under Community competence are on the table. In other areas, it is only recently that the Presidency has started to perform as an EPC negotiator. The experience gained at the UN Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (UNCDD) in August 1987 was very interesting. The major lesson was the importance of providing the Presidency representative with a genuine mandate allowing for concessions and compromises in negotiations with third countries. Of course, the greater the divergences among the Twelve the more difficult it was to obtain the necessary fallback positions. Confidence and confidentiality become key terms under such circumstances.
In a multilateral forum like the UNCDD, where consensus was the rule and where in practice the West was the reactive element which had to make concessions if consensus were to prevail, experience showed that the consensus-building process within the Twelve became identical with the consensus process of the UNCDD. What the Twelve could agree upon the whole conference could accept. This meant that EC partners, who had to make the most concessions in order to reach consensus had no incentive to negotiate fallback or bottom line positions within the Twelve when it turned out that defining such positions would be tantamount to negotiating the final outcome of the Conference.
In this delicate negotiation process each delegation of the Twelve had to assess, step by step, how far the collective bargaining could be carried and in particular if they remained prepared to accept the consequences of failure. The question was in reality whether the solidarity of the Twelve was strong enough. Would it extend also to the point of going down together and breaking the consensus process of the conference at the eleventh hour? That question is critical if one category of partners can accept the result of negotiations, while others cannot go that far but require additional accommodations.
At the UNCDD a question, which fortunately never became acute, was for the first category of partners to consider the domestic consequences of sharing the responsibility with other EPC partners for the breakdown of the conference, even if their instructions would have allowed them to accept the likely outcome at any given stage of the conference. Indeed, the SEA system still allows each partner to regain his freedom if agreement fails. But solidarity is only built where that temptation is resisted.
IV. Conclusion
It seems fair to conclude in light of the UNGA performance over the years that the Community has demonstrated a growing awareness "of the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to protect its common interests and independence." 27 Against the background that the foreign policy of the Community and its Member States is forged according to different sets of complex rules and procedures it is surprising that EC/EPC is able to perform jointly as fast as circumstances at the UNGA often require. Other UN Member States, in particular developing countries, have often optimistically perceived the EC/EPC as more cohesive than it really was. The Community is increasingly able to deliver according to these expectations. Other Western UN Member States express some concern about what they see as an increased collective Community influence within the Western caucuses. In any event, it is perhaps time that the Community observer changes its label from the EEC to the EC in order to illustrate that it is no longer just one international organization performing within the framework of another larger one, but the European Community acting within the United Nations.
To a large extent, the EC/EPC still confines itself to making statements and declarations. The prospects for increasing the EC/EPC role as an actor have to be further explored. The possibilities for the Twelve taking initiatives, for example, by tabling their own draft resolutions or co-sponsoring those of other UN partners should be used where joint action is likely to promote the Community interests. More time should be taken from internal Community discussions in New York and used for cultivating contacts and dialogue with third country delegations. In particular, the possibilities of negotiating resolutions should be further exploited. In this respect, a heavy responsibility rests with the Presidency. Perhaps the Troika formula should be utilized more frequently in New York in order to share the burdens more evenly among EC partners. In that connection, it is important for the EC/EPC negotiator to show flexible openness in consultations with like-minded partners and constructive firmness in negotiations with adversaries, without pretending to speak for the whole of Europe.
Cohesion of the Twelve in the UNGA should be measured not only in quantitative but also in qualitative terms, i.e., the Community's ability to influence important issues. In that regard, the negotiator-role is in itself significant "Harmony is clearly more likely to be achieved if a pattern of common negotiating with third parties can be established. Common interests are sometimes only definable in contradistinction to those of outsiders." M The potential of the EC/EPC as an actor on the UNGA scene holds promising prospects within the framework of a United Nations Organization which is steadily moving the set-pieces from an East-West to a North-South scenario. The EC/EPC may be better equipped to tackle many of the future challenges than any of the two superpowers.
Hill, 'Research into EPC: Tasks for the Future,' in European Political Cooperation in the 1980s, supra note 3 at 211.
